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Abstract
This paper reports the results of informational cascades experiments where
two di¤erent decision-making systems, anti-seniority and seniority are in-
vestigated. By implementing heterogeneous signal qualities associated with
the …xed order of decisions I compare the property of each system and ex-
amine heuristics human subjects use. Major …ndings are the following: (1)
complete cascades occur more frequently in seniority than in anti-seniority,
(2) seniority is more e¢cient than anti-seniority, but it increases the risk for
creating negative cascades, (3) for both systems, rational complete cascades
occur less frequently than those which the Bayesian theory predicts, (4) sub-
jects in seniority put equal weight on private signals and on predecessors’
predictions whereas those who in anti-seniority put more weight on private
signals than on predecessors’ predictions, (5) by analyzing deviations from
Bayesian posteriors, both overcon…dence and undercon…dence are identi…ed,
and (6) the anchoring e¤ect is veri…ed in deviations by overcon…dence, but
is not veri…ed in deviations by undercon…dence.
Keywords: Informational cascades, experiment, signal quality, overcon…-
dence, undercon…dence
JEL classi…cation: C91, C92, D81.
1 Introduction
Suppose a situation where individuals have informative but noisy private sig-
nals for an underlying state and they decide in sequence appropriate actions
for that state. If individuals’ actions are publicly observable, successors can
infer their predecessors’ private signals. These publicly inferred signals are
aggregated as the decision-making process goes on. When an individual’s
private signal does not correspond to the aggregated publicly inferred signals
the rational individual may ignore it and follow the actions the majority of
predecessors have chosen. Once an identical pattern of actions is established,
private signals are no longer informative, and informational cascades occur.
Bikhchandani, S., D. Hirshleifer, and I. Welch (1992) (hereafter BHW) and
Bannerjee, A. V. (1992) formulated such a situation and showed that infor-
mational cascades are caused by rational Bayesian update.
So far, many experiments have been conducted to test BHW’s theory
of informational cascades and its empirical applicability. In the pioneering
experiment by Anderson, L. R. and C. A. Holt (1997), they directly tested
BHW’s model of informational cascades by implementing binary-signal and
binary-action framework. Over 56 periods where informational cascades were
possible in the symmetrically identical signal quality treatment, positive cas-
cades occurred in 28 periods and negative cascades occurred in 13 periods1
while any cascades did not develop in 15 periods. Nöth, M. and M. We-
ber (1999) extended Anderson and Holt ’s experiment by introducing two
di¤erent qualities of signals and found that although informational cascades
occurred the frequency of occurrences is lower than the Bayesian theory sug-
gests because human subjects employed a heuristic, which puts too much
weight on their private signals. This tendency of overcon…dence on private
signals is observed in hypothetical experiment (Huck, S. and J. Oechssler
(2000)) and is invariant even when acquisition of signals is costly (Kraemer,
C., M. Nöth, and M. Weber (2000)). Kraemer, T. and M. Nöth (2000) tried
to identify the "anchoring and adjustment" e¤ect in the Bayesian updat-
ing process. By having subjects submit their probability judgements before
making predictions, they concluded that subjects’ decisions are anchored by
their private signals and adjusted by predecessors’ predictions. Oberhammer,
C. and A. Stiehler (2001) introduced binary-signal and continuous-action
model while Çelen, B. and S. Kariv (2004) implemented coutinuous-signal
and binary-action framework in order to …nd out subjects’ heuristics.
What we have known from these experiments is that informational cas-
1 In the terminology used in this paper, this includes both complete and partial cascades.
For detail, see section 4.1.
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cades certainly occur as BHW suggests, but actual occurrences are consis-
tently fewer than the Bayesian theory predicts. This can be attributed to
heuristics human subjects use in the process of probabilistic inference. Es-
pecially, tendency to putting more weight on private signals than on prede-
cessors’ predictions is often observed in many experiments.
In this paper I tested the occurrence of informational cascades by in-
troducing heterogenous qualities of private signals associated with the …xed
orders in making predictions. In a series of experiments I examined two sys-
tems, anti-seniority and seniority and compared each e¢ciency, potentiality
for cascades occurrence, and ability of extracting private signals. Major …nd-
ings are the following. Complete cascades occur more frequently in seniority
than in anti-seniority. Seniority is more e¢cient than anti-seniority, but it in-
creases the risk for creating negative cascades. For both treatments, rational
complete cascades occur less frequently than those which the Bayesian theory
predicts. Private signals can be extracted more e¤ectively in anti-seniority
than in seniority. In the process of decision-making, subjects in seniority
put equal weight on private signals and on predecessors’ predictions whereas
subjects in anti-seniority put more weight on private signals than on prede-
cessors’ predictions. For heuristics human subjects use, both overcon…dence
and undercon…dence are identi…ed. In addition, the anchoring e¤ect of pri-
vate signals is veri…ed in deviations by overcon…dence, but is not veri…ed in
deviations by undercon…dence.
The remaining paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces an-
alytical framework and presents theoretical predictions, section 3 describes
experimental procedure, section 4 reports the result and discusses its impli-
cations, and section 5 concludes.
2 Analytical Framework
There are two states of the world ! 2 fA;Bg: Each state realizes equally
likely, that is Pr(A) = p = 1=2 and Pr(B) = 1 ¡ p = 1=2: Each individual
does not know which state would have realized. However, he or she receives
an informative but noisy private signal and can infer the realized state by
observing it. Let ¾! be the private signal which indicates that realized state
is !: Then, the assumption of noisy information leads to 1=2 < Pr(Aj¾A) < 1
and 1=2 < Pr(B j¾B) < 1: Speci…cally I use heterogenous discrete signals with
six di¤erent qualities from .55 to .8 incremented by .05. That is, Pr(Aj¾A) or
Pr(B j¾B) is drawn from the setf:55; :6; :65; :7; :75; :8g without replacement.
Six subjects participate in each experimental session and each of them makes
a prediction which state would have realized one by one in sequence. The
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quality of signal is exogenously determined by the position where a subject
is assigned to. Let i 2 f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6g be the position, ¾i! be the signal the
subject in position i receives, and ¼i! be the prediction he or she makes.
In addition to private signals, each subject can observe all predictions
made by his or her predecessors. For example, the subject in position 2
can observe the prediction made by the subject in position 1, the subject
in position 6 (last position) can observe the …ve predictions made by the
subjects in positions from 1 to 5, and so on. Thus, the subjects assigned to
later than position 2 make predictions by referring to both private signals and
their predecessors’ predictions whereas the subject in position 1 can observe
only his or her private signal.
In experimental sessions, two treatments anti-seniority2 and seniority are
conducted. The di¤erence of each treatment is in the combinations of signal
qualities and orders of making predictions, which are summarized in table 1.
² Anti-seniority
In anti-seniority treatment, six subjects make predictions in ascending
order of the signal qualities. That is, the subject who has the least pre-
cise signal makes the prediction in position 1 (Pr(Aj¾1A) = Pr(Bj¾1B) =.55),
the subject who has the second least precise signal makes the prediction
in position 2 (Pr(Aj¾2A) = Pr(B j¾2B) =.6), and in this manner, the sub-
ject who has the most precise signal makes the prediction in position 6
(Pr(Aj¾6A) = Pr(Bj¾6B) =.8).
² Seniority
In seniority treatment, six subjects make predictions in descending or-
der of the signal qualities. That is, the subject who has the most pre-
cise signal makes the prediction in position 1 (Pr(Aj¾1A) = Pr(B j¾1B) =.8),
the subjects who has the second most precise signal makes the prediction
in position 2 (Pr(Aj¾2A) = Pr(B j¾2B) =.75), and in this manner, the sub-
ject who has the least precise signal makes the prediction in position 6
(Pr(Aj¾6A) = Pr(Bj¾6B) =.55).
In experimental sessions, the combinations of signal qualities and order of
decisions are common knowledge among all subjects. Thus, rational subjects
can calculate posterior probability by using Bayes’ rule. If they do so, these
two di¤erent treatments would create di¤erent behavioral patterns in the
aggregate as the following.
2The term anti-seniority is used in Ottaviani, M. and P. N. Sørensen (2001).
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In anti-seniority, imbalances between Bayesian posterior probability and
private signal occur only at 44 out of 252 decision nodes3 . Complete informa-
tional cascades4 can occur if subjects in the …rst three consecutive positions
make the same predictions. For example, the posterior probability that state
A would have realized given that the subjects in the …rst three consecu-
tive positions have predicted A and the subject in position 4 observes ¾4B is
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¾:4B) =
1
2£:55£:6£:65£:3
1
2£[(:55£:6£:65£:3)+(:45£:4£:35£:7)]
= :593. Thus, in this
case the subject in position 4 should ignore his or her private signal and
join the established pattern of predictions. Once he or she enters a cascade,
subjects in later than position 4 should ignore their private signals of ¾B as
well.
In seniority, imbalances between Bayesian posterior probability and pri-
vate signal occur as many as at 110 out of 252 decision nodes. More im-
portantly, the subject in position 2 should make the same predictions as
the subject in position 1 even when the private signal of the subject in po-
sition 2 does not correspond to the prediction of the subject in position 1
since Pr(Aj¼1A; ¾2B) = Pr(B j¼1B; ¾2A) =
1
2£:8£:25
1
2£[(:8£:25)+(:2£:75)]
= :571: This leads
to the result that subjects in a round should always make identical pre-
dictions whether they enter informational cascades or they truthfully reveal
their private signals.
3 Experimental Procedure
Subjects were recruited from undergraduate students of Keio University,
Shonan Fujisawa Campus. Six subjects participated in one session and they
played the game for 16 rounds. Each session took less than 100 minutes
including instruction and …nal questionnaire. Upon arriving the classroom,
each subject drew a card for determining where to be seated. Each seat
was separated and partitioned so that anyone could see neither the other
subject’s private draw nor his or her record sheet. Before each session be-
gan, subjects were instructed about the entire structure of the experiment.
They were informed about their tasks, two sources of information they re-
ceive, combinations of signal quality and order of decisions, di¤erence of each
treatment, payo¤ scheme, and other procedures concerning the experiment
in order to make them common knowledge among all subjects5 . After in-
structions, subjects took a quiz about the basic structure of the experiment.
3For the list of Bayesian posterior probability at each decision node, see Appendix C.
4For the de…nition of complete informational cascades, see section 4.1.
5Translated version of instructions for subjects is attached in Appendix B.
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If all the subjects submitted the correct answers, the experimental session
began from the …rst round. At the beginning of each round, the experimenter
announced which treatment to be conducted. Next, the experimenter drew
one of the two cards from the covered box. On a card a letter either ”A” or
”B” was printed and the letter on the card drawn represented the state of
the world for that round. The experimenter con…rmed the letter so as not
to be seen by subjects and hid it from them until the round …nished. Then,
each subject drew one of the six cards for determining the combinations of
the signal quality and the order of decision. Since each subject had been
noti…ed which treatment would be conducted at the beginning of the round,
there was no uncertainty in the combinations of signal quality and order of
decisions for each round.
As in the procedure of Anderson and Holt’s experiment, private signals
were implemented by having subjects draw one of the twenty white and red
marbles from a covered box. Marbles were identical in size, weight, and
the feel of material. White marbles represented state A and red marbles
represented state B. Di¤erent signal qualities were created by varying the
proportion of white and red marbles in a box given the realized state, treat-
ment, and the assigned signal quality for each subject. For example, if state A
had realized, a subject who was assigned to position 1 in anti-seniority treat-
ment drew a marble from the box containing 11 white and 9 red marbles.
Combinations of the marbles in each position and state for each treatment
is summarized in tables 2 and 3. Note that results of the draw indicate the
correct state more accurately than random guessing even for the least pre-
cise quality of signal because the proportion of the white and red marbles
correlates to the realized state.
A set of six boxes was used in one round and they are also identical
in size, shape, and material except codes marked on the bottom of each
boxes. They were stacked in a larger box separately by the states and were
kept in the other room. After con…rming the state for the round one of the
experimenters brought the appropriate stack from that room so that subjects
could not identify which stack was actually used.
By checking the codes on the bottom, the experimenter approached a sub-
ject one by one and presented one box which contained the exact proportion
of white and red marbles for each subject. After con…rming the color of the
marble drawn, each subject replaced it into the box and wrote down the state
indicated by the color in the space printed "Your Signal" on the subject’s
record sheet. Then, each subject was requested to make a prediction in the
determined order. Subjects made a prediction by writing down one of the
two states he or she thought which is more likely to be in the space printed
"Your Prediction" on the subject’s record sheet. The experimenter checked
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the prediction and wrote it down on the experimenter’s record sheet. Then,
the experimenter approached the subject in the next position and showed
the sequence of predictions made by his or her predecessors6. In making
predictions, subjects in positions from 2 to 6 can refer to them as well as
their private signals whereas the subject in position 1 can observe only his or
her private signal. After all six subjects submitted predictions, the card the
experimenter had drawn at the beginning of the round was revealed, then
subjects and the experimenter wrote down the results of their predictions.
This process was repeated for 16 times with combinations of each treatment.
The actual order of treatment in each session is shown in table 47.
A total of 66 subjects participated in the experiments. After all 16 rounds
…nished subjects were paid payo¤s privately in cash depending on the per-
formance in a session. For each correct prediction 200 Japanese yen (eq.
to $1.84) were paid. Average payment for AA (anti-seniority, anti-seniority)
treatments, AS (anti-seniority, seniority) treatments, and SA (seniority, anti-
seniority) treatment were 2176 yen, 2276 yen, and 2476 yen respectively8. In
addition, the minimum payment and the maximum payment were 800 yen
and 3200yen respectively.
4 Results
4.1 Aggregated Behavior
In order to compare the property of each treatment, I examine the results
based on the following four criteria.
6 In Anderson and Holt’s experiment, they announced predecessors’ predictions to all
subjects. Thus, subjects who had completed making predictions could observe predictions
made by other subjects in later positions. In my experiment, the experimenter reported
predecessors’ predictions only to the subject who was in making prediction. This is because
I intended not to have sub jects count predictions in later positions and use them as a
heuristic in following rounds.
7 In session 1, only 12 rounds in anti-seniority treatment were conducted due to overtime.
In session 2, anti-seniority treatment was conducted for all 16 rounds. In sessions 3 and
4, anti-seniority treatment was conducted for the …rst 12 rounds followed by seniority
treatment for the last 4 rounds. For sessions 4 to 11, each treatment is conducted by turns
for the …rst 12 rounds and the last 4 rounds.
8 In another day participants in session 1 were paid additional 544 yen which is the
average payment of 4-round anti-seniority treatment as compensation for the early close
of the session.
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Complete positive (negative) cascades
A complete positive (negative) cascade denotes a pattern of behaviors
such that there is at least one subject who ignores his or her private signal and
all of the six subjects in a round make identical correct (incorrect) predictions.
Among complete positive (negative) cascades, a pattern of behaviors such
that all predictions are consistent with Bayesian posterior probability is called
a rational complete positive (negative) cascade.
Partial cascades
A partial cascade denotes a pattern of behaviors such that there is at
least one subject who ignores his or her private signal but another subject
collapses the established identical predictions. As a result, predictions are
not identical in a round.
Full revelations
A full revelation denotes a pattern of behaviors such that all of the sub-
jects make predictions consistent with their private signals. An aggregated
behavior is counted as a full revelation whether they are consistent with
Bayesian posteriors or not, and whether all of the predictions are identical
or not.
Herds
A herd denotes identical predictions in a round. This may include com-
plete cascades and full revelations9. Smith, L. and P. N. Sørensen (2000) and
Çelen, B. and S. Kariv (2004) emphasized that there is a signi…cant di¤er-
ence between informational cascades and herds. Informational cascades oc-
cur when subjects ignore their private signals in making predictions, whereas
herds may occur when subjects happen to make identical predictions, not
necessarily ignoring their private signals.
I report the results as a list of observations.
Observation 1
Learning within each session was not observed.
If subjects learn a systematic way of making predictions by some rea-
sons, patterns of predictions should be di¤erent between earlier rounds and
later rounds within a session. Tables 5 and 6 report the Mann-Whitney U
9Note that the other three criteria except herds do not overlap each other.
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test on equal proportion of predictions which is consistent with the Bayesian
posterior probability between the …rst two rounds and the last two rounds
within each session for each treatment. In anti-seniority, the null hypotheses
of no di¤erence cannot be rejected for all sessions. In seniority, almost all
predictions in the …rst and the last two rounds within each session are iden-
tically consistent with Bayesian posterior so that the Mann-Whitney U test
cannot be performed for those sessions. In sessions 6 and 11 where di¤erent
proportions of Bayesian consistent predictions are observed, they are not sig-
ni…cantly di¤erent between the …rst and last two rounds. Therefore, we can
say that systematic pattern of learning within each session is not observed,
so that we can pool the data for each treatment and compare the property
of them. Results of the aggregated behavior in all of the 11 sessions for each
treatment are summarized in table 7.
Observation 2
Each state realized equally likely within and between each treatment.
The realizations of state A are 55 out of 112 rounds in anti-seniority and
31 out of 60 rounds in seniority (table 7, row 1). The two-tailed test of
population proportion cannot reject the null hypothesis that each state real-
ized with equal frequency for each treatment (table 9). In addition, Mann-
Whitney U test shows that the realizations of state A are not signi…cantly
di¤erent between two treatments (table 8 row1). Therefore, draws by the
experimenters are not biased within and between each treatment.
Observation 3
Subjects made more correct predictions in seniority than in anti-seniority.
Proportion of correct predictions in anti-seniority is 69.49% whereas that
in seniority is 81.94% (table 7, row 2). Mann-Whitney U test shows this
di¤erence is statistically signi…cant (table 8 row 2). We can say that seniority
increases the subjects’ welfare in the sense that it leads to more correct
predictions.
Observation 4
Complete (positive and negative) cascades and rational complete (positive
and negative) cascades occurred more frequently in seniority than in anti-
seniority, whereas partial cascades occurred more frequently in anti-seniority
than in seniority.
The proportion of complete positive cascades in anti-seniority is 14.29%
whereas that in seniority is 60.00% (table 7, row 3), which is signi…cantly
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di¤erent (table 8, row 3). The proportion of complete negative cascades
in anti-seniority is 1.79% whereas that in seniority is 10.00% (table 7, row
4), which is also signi…cantly di¤erent (table 8 row 4). The proportion of
rational complete positive cascades in anti-seniority is 6.25% whereas that
in seniority is 60.00% (table 7, row 5), which is signi…cantly di¤erent (table
8, row 5). The proportion of rational complete negative cascades in anti-
seniority is .89% whereas that in seniority is 10.00% (table 7, row 6), which
is also signi…cantly di¤erent (table 8, row 6). In addition, the proportion of
partial cascades in anti-seniority is 25.89% whereas that in seniority is 10.00%
(table 7, row 7), which is signi…cantly di¤erent (table 8 row 7). Therefore
seniority enhances the occurrence of complete positive cascades but it also
increases the risk for creating complete negative cascades. Meanwhile, the
established cascades are more likely to be collapsed in anti-seniority than in
seniority.
Observation 5
For both treatments, rational complete (positive and negative) cascades
occurred less frequently than those which the Bayesian theory predicts.
For anti-seniority, rational complete cascades occur if the …rst three sub-
jects make the same predictions as seen in section 2. By Bayes’ rule, if the
…rst three consecutive subjects made same predictions, the fourth subject
cannot help making the same prediction as them even when his or her pri-
vate signal does not correspond to the predecessors’ predictions. Since herds
by full revelations are not counted in rational complete positive cascades,
the probability that rational complete positive cascades occur is given by the
probability that the all six subjects draw the correct marbles subtracted from
the probability that the …rst three subjects draw the correct marbles. That
is, [Pr(Aj¾1A)£ Pr(Aj¾2A) £ Pr(Aj¾3A)] ¡ [Pr(Aj¾1A) £ Pr(Aj¾2A)£ Pr(Aj¾3A) £
Pr(Aj¾4A) £ Pr(Aj¾5A) £ Pr(Aj¾6A)] = [Pr(B j¾1B) £ Pr(B j¾2B) £ Pr(B j¾3B)] ¡
[Pr(B j¾1B) £ Pr(B j¾2B) £ Pr(Bj¾3B) Pr(B j¾4B) £ Pr(B j¾5B) £ Pr(Bj¾6B)] =
(:55 £ :6 £ :65) ¡ (:55 £ :6 £ :65 £ :7 £ :75 £ :8) = :215 ¡ :090 = :125
On the other hand, rational complete negative cascades would occur if all of
the …rst three subjects happen to make incorrect predictions. The probabil-
ity that rational complete negative cascades occur is given by the probability
that the all six subjects draw the incorrect marbles subtracted from the
probability that the …rst three subjects draw the incorrect marbles. That is,
[Pr(Aj¾1B) £ Pr(Aj¾2B) £ Pr(Aj¾3B)] ¡ [Pr(Aj¾1B) £ Pr(Aj¾2B) £ Pr(Aj¾3B) £
Pr(Aj¾4B) £ Pr(Aj¾5B) £ Pr(Aj¾6B)] = [Pr(Bj¾1A) £ Pr(B j¾2A) £ Pr(B j¾3A)] ¡
[Pr(B j¾1A)£ Pr(Bj¾2A)£ Pr(B j¾3A)Pr(B j¾4A)£ Pr(B j¾5A)£ Pr(Bj¾6A)] = (:45£
:4£ :35)¡(:45£ :4£ :35£ :3£ :25£ :2) = :063¡ :001 = :062: For seniority, all
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the subjects later than position 2 should follow the …rst subject’s prediction,
which inevitably leads to a herd in each round. Among rational complete
cascades, whether they turn to be positive or negative depends exactly on
whether the …rst subject makes the correct prediction. As in the case of
anti-seniority, the probability that rational complete positive cascades occur
is given by the probability that the all six subjects draw the correct marbles
subtracted from the probability that the …rst subject draw the correct marble.
That is, Pr(Aj¾1A)¡[Pr(Aj¾1A)£Pr(Aj¾2A)£ Pr(Aj¾3A)£ Pr(Aj¾4A)£Pr(Aj¾5A)£
Pr(Aj¾6A)] = Pr(B j¾1B) ¡ [Pr(Bj¾1B) £ Pr(B j¾2B) £ Pr(B j¾3B)Pr(B j¾4B) £
Pr(B j¾5B)£ Pr(B j¾6B)] = (:8)¡(:55£ :6£ :65£ :7£ :75£ :8) = :8¡:090 = :710:
On the other hand, the probability that rational complete negative cascades
occur is given by the probability that the all six subjects draw the incorrect
marbles subtracted from the probability that the …rst subject draw the in-
correct marble. That is, Pr(Aj¾1B) ¡ [Pr(Aj¾1B) £ Pr(Aj¾2B) £ Pr(Aj¾3B) £
Pr(Aj¾4B) £ Pr(Aj¾5B) £ Pr(Aj¾6B)] = Pr(B j¾1A) ¡ [Pr(Bj¾1A) £ Pr(B j¾2A) £
Pr(B j¾3A)Pr(B j¾4A) £ Pr(Bj¾5A) £ Pr(B j¾6A)] = (:2) ¡ (:45 £ :4 £ :35 £ :3 £
:25 £ :2) = :2 ¡ :001 = :199:
However, if we look at the proportions of rational complete cascades ac-
tually observed in experiments, they are consistently lower than those which
the Bayesian theory predicts (table 7, rows 5 and 6). The one-tailed test
of population proportion shows that, for both treatments, the observed pro-
portion of rational complete (positive and negative) cascades is signi…cantly
lower than the theoretical predictions (tables 10 and 11). This …nding is con-
sistent with previous experiments where fewer occurrences of informational
cascades than the theoretical predictions were observed such as in Anderson,
L. R. and C. A. Holt (1997), Çelen, B. and S. Kariv (2004), Huck, S. and J.
Oechssler (2000), Nöth, M. and M. Weber (2000), and Oberhammer, C. and
A. Stiehler (2001).
Observation 6
Full revelations occurred more frequently in anti-seniority than in senior-
ity.
The proportion of full revelations in anti-seniority is 58.04% whereas that
in seniority is 20.00% (table 7, row 8), which is signi…cantly di¤erent (table
8, row 8). Thus, anti-seniority extracts private signals more e¤ectively than
seniority10.
10Ottaviani, M. and P. N. Sørensen (2001) studied theoretical model of informational
cascades resulted from reputational concern in the framework of heterogeneous signal
qualities. They showed that anti-seniority is e¤ective in extracting private information in
some circumstances, but is not always so.
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Observation 7
Herds occurred more frequently in seniority than in anti-seniority.
Herds are caused by complete cascades or full revelations. The proportion
of herds in anti-seniority is 28.57% whereas that in seniority is 83.33% (table
7 row 9), which is signi…cantly di¤erent (table 8, row 9).
4.2 Individual Behavior
We observed that aggregated behavior is di¤erent in several aspects between
two treatments. Now let us examine how each subject uses the two sources
of information, private signal and predecessors’ predictions. In order to in-
vestigate how weight subjects place on the two sources of information, I use
Grether,M. (1989) and Hung, A. and C. Plott (2000)’s logit regression model.
Let Pr(Aj¼
1
!;:::;¼
i¡1
! ;¾i!)
Pr(B j¼1!;:::;¼i¡1! ;¾i!) be the odds of the individual who are in position
i in favor of state A over state B after observing his or her predecessors’
predictions ¼1! ; :::; ¼i¡1! and his or her own private signal ¾i!. Then,
Pr(Aj¼1!; :::; ¼i¡1! ; ¾i!)
Pr(B j¼1!; :::; ¼i¡1! ; ¾i!)
=
Pr(A) Pr(¼1!; :::; ¼i¡1! ; ¾i!jA)=Pr(¼1!; :::; ¼i¡1! ; ¾i!)
Pr(B) Pr(¼1!; :::; ¼i¡1! ; ¾i!jB)=Pr(¼1!; :::; ¼i¡1! ; ¾i!)
= Pr(A) Pr(¼
1
!; :::; ¼i¡1! ; ¾i!jA)
Pr(B) Pr(¼1!; :::; ¼i¡1! ; ¾i!jB)
=
Pr(A) Pr(¼1!; :::; ¼i¡1! jA) Pr(¾i!jA)
Pr(B) Pr(¼1!; :::; ¼i¡1! jB)Pr(¾i!jB)
:
The last equation holds because of the assumption that ¼1!; :::; ¼i¡1! and
¾i! are independent. By taking logs,
ln Pr(Aj¼
1
!; :::; ¼i¡1! ; ¾i!)
Pr(B j¼1!; :::; ¼i¡1! ; ¾i!)
= ln Pr(A)
Pr(B)
+ ln Pr(¼
1
!; :::; ¼i¡1! jA)
Pr(¼1!; :::; ¼i¡1! jB)
+ ln Pr(¾
i
!jA)
Pr(¾i!jB)
:
(1)
Since ln Pr(A)Pr(B) = 0, (1) can be generalized to
Y im = ¯0 + ¯1 ln
Pr(¼1!; :::; ¼i¡1! jA)
Pr(¼1!; :::; ¼i¡1! jB)
+ ¯2 ln
Pr(¾i!jA)
Pr(¾i!jB)
+ uim: (2)
where uim is a random disturbance.
Three possible combinations of coe¢cients are of interest as special cases
of equation (2). If ¯0 = 0 and ¯1 = ¯2, then subjects put equal weight on
private signals and on predecessors’ predictions. If ¯0 = 0 and 0 < ¯2 < ¯1;
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then subjects put more weight on predecessors’ predictions than on private
signals. If ¯0 = 0 and 0 < ¯1 < ¯2, then subjects put more weight on
private signals than on predecessors’ predictions. I estimate the coe¢cients
of equation (2) by the logit regression for each treatment. The logit regression
is performed for subjects in positions from 2 to 6 since the subjects in position
1 do not observe predecessors’ predictions. The results of the logit regressions
are shown in tables 12 and 13.
Observation 8
There is no systematic bias in predicting a state.
In both treatments ¯0 = 0 cannot be rejected at the 95% signi…cant level.
Thus, predictions made by subjects are not biased toward one of the states.
Tables 14 and 15 show the chi-square tests of the null hypothesis that
the estimated coe¢cients of private signals and predecessors’ predictions are
equal. This hypothesis can be rejected for anti-seniority whereas cannot be
rejected for seniority. To summarize, we can conclude that
Observation 9
Subjects in seniority put equal weight on private signals and on predeces-
sors’ predictions whereas subjects in anti-seniority put more weight on private
signals than on predecessors’ predictions.
4.3 Analysis of Deviation
We observed that rational complete cascades occur signi…cantly less fre-
quently than those which the Bayesian theory predicts for both treatments.
Then, we should investigate why human subjects deviate from the prediction
of the Bayesian theory. To do so, we formally de…ne three types of devi-
ations, overcon…dence, undercon…dence, and irrational as often emphasized
in probabilistic inference problem (Edwards, W. (1968), Gri¢n, D. and A.
Tversky (1992), Tversky, A. and D. Kahneman (1971), Weinstein, N. (1980)).
Overcon…dence can be de…ned as a prediction which is not consistent with
Bayesian posterior but consistent with the subject’s private signal. Under-
con…dence can be de…ned as a prediction which is consistent with neither
Bayesian posterior nor the subject’s private signal but consistent with a pre-
diction which is made by at least one of his or her predecessors. Deviations
which is not consistent with Bayesian posterior and cannot be explained by
these two criteria are de…ned as irrational11 .
11Therefore, an irrational prediction is consistent neither with Bayesian posterior, the
subject’s private signal, nor any predecessors’ predictions
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The proportions of overcon…dence, undercon…dence, and irrational for
each treatment and for each position are summarized in tables 16 and 17
and depicted in …gures 1 and 2. In anti-seniority, overcon…dence cannot oc-
cur in positions 2 and 3 because obeying private signals is always consistent
with the Bayesian posteriors12. In seniority, undercon…dence cannot occur
in position 2 because obeying the prediction of the subject in position 1 and
ignoring his or her private signal is always consistent with Bayesian pos-
terior. Overcon…dence and undercon…dence certainly exist in anti-seniority
whereas only overcon…dence occurred frequently in position 2 and deviations
are rarely observed in the other positions in seniority13.
Given the existence of overcon…dence and undercon…dence, one might
think that subjects’ predictions are "anchored" by their signal qualities14.
That is, subjects with more precise signals tend to be overcon…dent and
subjects with less precise signals tend to be undercon…dent. To examine this,
we need to investigate the relationship between qualities of private signals
and deviating behaviors for each Bayesian posterior probability. Tables 18-21
show that the percentage of deviations, for each position, categorized by …ve
levels of Bayesian posteriors that the state A would have realized. Note that
deviations should occur most frequently in the level of Bayesian posterior
40-60% because subjects would not be sure which state has realized around
posteriors 50%.
If there exists the anchoring e¤ect in anti-seniority, deviation by under-
con…dence would occur more in earlier positions with more broad range of
posteriors and less in later positions with less broad range of posteriors be-
cause subjects with less precise signals are undercon…dent too much about
12For the list of Bayesian posterior probability in each decision node, see Appendix C.
13The existence of undercon…dence would create possibility of cascades whereas the ex-
istence of overcon…dence would collapse potential cascades. If there is at least one subject
who makes an overcon…dent prediction, the potential cascades will inevitably collapse.
The fact that rational complete cascades are observed less frequently than Bayesian the-
ory predicts can be attributed to the existence of overcon…dence. This observation that
existence of overcon…dence reduce the cascades is consistent with past several experiments,
such as Kraemer, T. and M. Nöth (2000) and Nöth, M. and M. Weber (2000).
14Kraemer, T. and M. Nöth (2000) reported that they identi…ed the anchoring e¤ect.
In their experiment they compared posteriors evaluated by subjects and actual posteriors.
By calculating their di¤erences, they found that they are minimized when the posteriors
are close to sub jects’ private signals and concluded that this fact supports anchoring
hypothesis. However, the problem is that they did not provide subjects with any incentive
to evaluate posteriors seriously as Oberhammer, C. and A. Stiehler (2001) pointed out.
In order to investigate existence of the anchoring e¤ect, one needs to look at deviating
behavior itself resulting from over- and undercon…dence and examine the relationship
between deviation and signal quality for each Bayesian posteriors. The following part of
this section tries to do it.
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the realized state compared to the actual Bayesian posteriors. On the other
hand, deviations by overcon…dence would occur more in later positions with
more broad range of posteriors and less in earlier positions with less broad
range of posteriors because subjects with more precise signals are con…dent
too much about the realized state compared to the actual Bayesian posteri-
ors.
Observed deviations by undercon…dence in anti-seniority (table 18) cer-
tainly decrease from 9.82% in position 3 to 1.78% in position 5. However,
there are two increases from 4.47% in position 2 to 9.82% in position 3 and
from 1.78% in position 5 to 2.68% in position 6. In addition, deviations
except in the range of 40-60% occurred not in the earlier positions but in
the later positions. These two observations are not consistent with the sys-
tematic pattern of deviations discussed above so that we conclude that the
anchoring hypothesis has only a partial explanation for deviations by un-
dercon…dence in anti-seniority. For observed deviations by overcon…dence in
anti-seniority (table 19), they increase from 5.36% in position 4 to 12.50%
in position 6 and deviations except 40%-60% occurred not in the earlier po-
sitions but in the later positions. In position 5, some deviations occurred
in the level of posteriors 20-40 % or 60-80 %. Furthermore, in position 6,
deviations occurred even when Bayesian posteriors suggest the realization of
one state rather than the other with high probability such as in the level of
posteriors 0-20 % or 80-100 %. In fact, there were subjects who predicted
"A" in spite that their posteriors that the state A would have realized were
as low as 20% and those who predicted "B" in spite that their posteriors
were as high as 85%. By looking at deviations of positions 4-6, we con…rm
that subjects with high signal qualities are more likely to deviate from the
Bayesian posteriors. This systematic pattern of deviations, unlike the case
of undercon…dence, supports the hypothesis of the anchoring e¤ect.
If there exists the anchoring e¤ect in seniority, by the same reasoning as
in anti-seniority, deviations by undercon…dence would occur more in later
positions with more broad range of posteriors and less in earlier positions
with less broad range of posteriors. On the other hand, deviations by over-
con…dence would occur more in earlier positions with more broad range of
posteriors and less in later positions with less broad range of posteriors.
However, we observed seldom deviations in seniority as the results of
logit regression suggest. Obvious deviations occurred only in position 2 for
overcon…dence when Bayesian posteriors are either 42.8% or 57.2%. This fact
moderately supports the hypothesis of the anchoring e¤ect for overcon…dence,
however few observations of deviations for undercon…dence do not support
it for undercon…dence. To summarize, we have the following observation.
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Observation 10
The anchoring e¤ect is identi…ed in deviations by overcon…dence but not
identi…ed in deviations by undercon…dence.
Why is not the anchoring e¤ect clearly identi…ed in deviations by under-
con…dence in both treatments?
A possible reason for unidenti…ability of the anchoring e¤ect in seniority
can be attributed to the intrinsic structure of posteriors in seniority. Since
posteriors that state A would have realized are extremely high or low in
later positions such as 5 or 6 in seniority, subjects with less precise signals
can predict consistent with Bayesian posteriors relatively easily by following
the established pattern of predecessors’ predictions even when their private
signals do not correspond to them. In such cases, making undercon…dent
predictions are almost irrational.
A possible reason for the unclear identi…cation of the anchoring e¤ect
in anti-seniority would be related to "the strength and weight e¤ect of the
sample". Gri¢n, D. and A. Tversky (1992) studied this e¤ect in determin-
ing subject’s attitudes toward overcon…dence and undercon…dence. Through
a series of hypothetical coin-spinning experiments, they found that human
subjects are more likely to be overcon…dent when the sample is small and it
shows extreme result (i.e. weight of the sample is low and strength of the
sample is high), and more likely to be undercon…dent when the sample is
large and it shows moderate result (i.e. weight of the sample is high and
strength of the sample is low)15.
If the strength and weight e¤ect of the sample exists in our informational
cascades experiment, subjects in earlier positions would be overcon…dent
whereas subjects in later positions would be undercon…dent because subjects
in earlier positions have a smaller sample (i.e. fewer predecessors’ predictions)
than subjects in later positions16 . Then, undercon…dence in earlier positions
would be o¤set by this overcon…dence and result in the unclear identi…cation
of the anchoring e¤ect in anti-seniority.
15 In probabilistic inference experiments, Edwards, W. (1968) observed that subjects
were more likely to be undercon…dent whereas Tversky, A. and D. Kahneman (1971)
veri…ed that they were more likely to be overcon…dent compared to the Bayesian posterior.
However, Gri¢n, D. and A. Tversky (1992) argued that these inconsistent observations
are comprehensible as the former used a large and moderately strong sample and the latter
used a small and fairly strong sample.
16Overcon…dence which would be caused by the strength and weight e¤ect of the sample
is observed in informational cascades experiment by Çelen, B. and S. Kariv (2004). They
found that "subjects who are early decision-makers tend to rely more heavily on their own
information in the learning process, which then becomes available to late decision-makers,
who tend more to be Bayesian."
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However, if the above explanation holds, we have to say that this ex-
periment confounds the anchoring e¤ect and the strength and weight e¤ect
of the sample. Although the anchoring e¤ect is identi…ed in deviations by
overcon…dence in anti-seniority this should have been also canceled out by
undercon…dence resulted from the strength and weight e¤ect of the sample
to some extent. In order to evaluate each e¤ect clearly, we need to distin-
guish each other and investigate how these two e¤ects interact in various
situations. Because this experiment cannot do that, we need some other
settings. One possible improvement would be in a design of an experiment
where signal quality is identical in one treatment but is di¤erent among
di¤erent treatments. By comparing patterns of deviations resulted from dif-
ferent treatments, one would be able to identify the anchoring e¤ect and the
strength and weights e¤ect more clearly.
5 Conclusion
By implementing heterogenous signal qualities associated with the …xed or-
ders of making predictions in the two di¤erent decision-making systems, we
have observed the di¤erent consequences of each system and identi…ed heuris-
tics human subjects use.
For the investigations of anti-seniority and seniority, we have observed the
following. Complete cascades occur more frequently in seniority than in anti-
seniority. Seniority is more e¢cient than anti-seniority, but it increases the
risk for creating negative cascades. For both treatments, rational complete
cascades occur less frequently than those which the Bayesian theory predicts.
Private signals can be extracted more e¤ectively in anti-seniority than in
seniority. In the process of decision-making, subjects in seniority put equal
weight on private signals and on predecessors’ predictions whereas subjects
in anti-seniority put more weight on private signals than on predecessors’
predictions.
By analyzing the relationship between signal qualities and deviations from
Bayesian posteriors, we have identi…ed both overcon…dence and undercon…-
dence. In addition, the anchoring e¤ect is veri…ed in deviations by overcon-
…dence, but is not veri…ed in deviations by undercon…dence. The uniden-
ti…cation problem of the anchoring e¤ect in deviations by undercon…dence
in seniority would be due to the intrinsic structure of posteriors where sub-
jects in later positions consistently face extreme high or low posteriors. The
unclear identi…cation problem of the anchoring e¤ect in deviations by un-
dercon…dence in anti-seniority can be explained by the strength and weight
e¤ect of the sample by which subjects with the small sample would be over-
16
con…dent. In order to investigate the relationship between the anchoring
e¤ect and the strength and weight e¤ect of the sample more accurately, we
have to di¤erentiate each other in some other experimental settings.
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Appendices
A Tables and …gures
Position
1 2 3 4 5 6
Treatment Anti-seniority .55 .6 .65 .7 .75 .8
Seniority .8 .75 .7 .65 .6 .55
Table 1: Combination of signal qualities and order of decisions
in each treatment
Anti-seniority
Position (signal quality)
Realized Marbles 1 (.55) 2 (.6) 3 (.65) 4 (.7) 5 (.75) 6 (.8)
state
A White 11 12 13 14 15 16
Red 9 8 7 6 5 4
B White 9 8 7 6 5 4
Red 11 12 13 14 15 16
Table 2: Contents of boxes in each state and each position: Anti-seniority
Seniority
Position (signal quality)
Realized Marbles 1 (.8) 2 (.75) 3 (7) 4 (.65) 5 (.6) 6 (.55)
state
A White 16 15 14 13 12 11
Red 4 5 6 7 8 9
B White 4 5 6 7 8 9
Red 16 15 14 13 12 11
Table 3: Contents of boxes in each state and each position: Seniority
Sessions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Rounds 1-12 A A A A A S A S A S A
Rounds 12-16 - A S S S A S A S A S
Table 4: Treatments conducted in each sessions
(A: Anti-seniority, S:Seniority)
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Anti-seniority
Session 1 2 3 4 5 6
z ¡:440 ¡:604 :000 1:319 ¡:604 1:813
P > jzj :660 :546 1:000 :187 :546 :070
Session 7 8 9 10 11
z ¡:604 1:000 ¡1:000 :000 :604
P > jzj :546 :3173 :3173 1:000 :546
Table 5: Mann-Whitney U tests of equal proportion of predictions which is
consistent with Bayesian posterior probability between the …rst two rounds
and the last two rounds for each session: Anti-seniority
Seniority
Session 6 11
z 1:000 1:000
P > jzj :3173 :3173
Table 6: Mann-Whitney U tests of equal proportion of predictions which is
consistent with Bayesian posterior probability between the …rst two rounds
and the last two rounds for each session: Seniority17
Aggregated behavior
Anti-seniority Seniority
112 rounds, 60 rounds,
672 decisions 360 decisions
Realization of state A 55 (49.11%) 31 (51.67%)
Correct predictions 467 (69.49%) 295 (81.94%)
Complete positive cascades 16 (14.29%) 36 (60.00%)
Complete negative cascades 2 (1.79%) 6 (10.00%)
Rational complete positive cascades 7 (6.25%) 36 (60.00%)
Rational complete negative cascades 1 (.89%) 6 (10.00%)
Partial cascades 29 (25.89%) 6 (10.00%)
Full revelations 65 (58.04%) 12 (20.00%)
Herds 32 (28.57%) 50 (83.33%)
Table 7: Aggregated behavior
17All the predictions except in sessions 6 and 11 in the …rst and the last two rounds were
identically consistent with Bayesian posterior probability, so that Mann-Whitney test of
the equal proportions cannot be performed for those sessions.
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Tests of equal proportion for each treatment
z P > jzj
Realization of state A -.319 .7497
Correct predictions -4.335 .0000
Complete positive cascades -6.204 .0000
Complete negative cascades -2.431 .0151
Rational complete positive cascades -7.736 .0000
Rational complete negative cascades -2.873 .0041
Partial cascades 2.460 .0139
Full revelations 4.767 .0000
Herds -6.833 .0000
Table 8: Mann-Whitney U tests of equal proportion for each treatment
Realization of each state
Anti-seniority Seniority
z=-.189, P > jzj=.8501 z=.258, P > jzj=.7963
Table 9: Tests of population proportion on equal realization of each state
Theoretical prediction and actual occurrence:
Rational complete positive cascades
Anti-seniority Seniority
z=-2.000, P < z=.0228 z=-1.878, P < z=.0302
Table 10: Tests of population proportion on the equality between
theoretical prediction and actual occurrence:
Rational complete positive cascades
Theoretical prediction and actual occurrence:
Rational complete negative cascades
Anti-seniority Seniority
z=-2.329, P < z=.0099 z=-1.921, P < z=.0274
Table 11: Tests of population proportion on the equality between
theoretical prediction and actual occurrence:
Rational complete negative cascades
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Anti-seniority
Obs.: 560, Log-likelihood:-146.0963, Â2: 483.95, P > Â2: .0000, Pseudo R2: .6235
Estimated coe¢cient Standard error z P > jzj
¯0 -.0946 .1509 -.63 .531
¯1 1.9674 .2295 8.57 .000
¯2 3.6489 .3212 11.36 .000
Table 12: Result of logit regression: Anti-seniority
Seniority
Obs.: 300, Log-likelihood:-32.1571, Â2: 349.32 P > Â2: .0000, Pseudo R2: .8445
Estimated coe¢cient Standard error z P > jzj
¯0 -.6120 .3603 -1.70 .089
¯1 1.7908 .2923 6.13 .000
¯2 2.4707 .5487 4.50 .000
Table 13: Result of logit regression: Seniority
Test of estimated coe¢cients: Anti-seniority
H0 : ¯1 = ¯2
Â2 : 75:72
P > Â2 : :0000
Table 14: Chi-square test of the hypothesis that estimated coe¢cients of
private signals and predecessors’ predictions are equal: Anti-seniority
Test of estimated coe¢cients: Seniority
H0 : ¯1 = ¯2
Â2 : 3:02
P > Â2 : :0822
Table 15: Chi-square test of the hypothesis that estimated coe¢cients of
private signals and predecessors’ predictions are equal: Seniority
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Deviations from Bayesian posterior by position
Position Overcon…dence Undercon…dence Irrational
1 - - 15(13.39%)
2 - 5 (4.47%) 2 (1.78%)
3 - 11 (9.82%) 0 (.00%)
4 6 (5.36%) 4 (3.57%) 2 (1.78%)
5 11 (9.82%) 2 (1.78%) 0 (.00%)
6 14 (12.50%) 3 (2.68%) 0 (.00%)
Total 31 (9.23%18) 25 (4.46%) 19 (2.83%)
Table 16: Deviations from Bayesian posterior by position: Anti-seniority
Deviations from Bayesian posterior by position
Position Overcon…dence Undercon…dence Irrational
1 - - 0(.00%)
2 9 (15.00%) - 0(.00%)
3 0 (.00%) 0(.00%) 0(.00%)
4 0 (.00%) 1 (1.67%) 0(.00%)
5 1 (1.67%) 0(.00%) 0(.00%)
6 0 (.00%) 0(.00%) 0(.00%)
Total 10 (3.33%) 1 (.004%) 0(.00%)
Table 17: Deviations from Bayesian posterior by position: Seniority
Deviations from Bayesian posterior
by position and the level of posteriors
% of deviations by position
2 3 4 5 6
Bayesian posterior 0-20 .00 .00 .00 .89 .00
probabilities that state 20-40 .00 .00 .89 .00 .89
A would have realized (%) 40-60 4.47 9.82 1.79 .00 .89
60-80 .00 .00 .89 .89 .00
80-100 .00 .00 .00 .00 .89
Table 18: Percentage of deviations from Bayesian posterior probability for
each position and each level of posterior: Undercon…dence in anti-seniority
18The percentage in the total deviations for tables 16 and 17 is all the observed deviations
devided by total decisions where deviations are possible.
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Deviations from Bayesian posterior
by position and the level of posterior
% of deviations by position
4 5 6
Bayesian posterior 0-20 .00 .00 2.68
probabilities that state 20-40 .00 2.68 .00
A would have realized (%) 40-60 5.36 3.58 2.68
60-80 .00 3.58 4.46
80-100 .00 .00 2.68
Table 19: Percentage of deviations from Bayesian posterior probability for
each position and each level of posterior: Overcon…dence in anti-seniority
Deviations from Bayesian posterior
by position and the level of posterior
% of deviations by position
3 4 5 6
Bayesian posterior 0-20 .00 .00 .00 .00
probabilities that state 20-40 .00 .00 .00 .00
A would have realized (%) 40-60 .00 .00 .00 .00
60-80 .00 1.79 .00 .00
80-100 .00 .00 .00 .00
Table 20: Percentage of deviations from Bayesian posterior probability for
each position and each level of posterior: Undercon…dence in seniority
Deviations from Bayesian posterior
by position and the level of posterior
% of deviations by position
2 3 4 5 6
Bayesian posterior 0-20 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
probabilities that state 20-40 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
A would have realized (%) 40-60 15.00 .00 .00 .00 .00
60-80 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
80-100 .00 .00 .00 1.79 .00
Table 21: Percentage of deviations from Bayesian posterior probability for
each position and each level of posterior: Overcon…dence in seniority
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Figure 1: Proportions of overcon…dence and undercon…dence: Anti-seniority
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Figure 2: Proportions of overcon…dence and undercon…dence: Seniority
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B Instructions for subjects
Instruction
Welcome!
This experiment is for the study of economic decision-making. The in-
structions are simple, and if you follow them carefully and you make good
decisions, you can earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid
to you in cash after the experiment.
Your task
At the beginning of each round, the experimenter will draw one of the
two cards from covered box. On a card a letter either "A" or "B" is printed.
We call the letter printed on the card as the "state" for that round. The
experimenter will con…rm the letter so as not to be seen by you and hide it
until the round …nishes. Your task in this experiment is to predict the state
for that round.
Order of making prediction
In this experiment you will make prediction one by one in sequence. Your
position of making prediction is determined by drawing one of the six cards.
On a card you will draw a number "1", "2", "3", "4", "5", or "6" is printed.
This number is your position. For example if you draw the card on which
the number "4" is printed, you will make prediction in position 4.
Information for making prediction
In predicting the state, you will receive two kinds of information, private
signals and predecessors’ predictions. You may or may not make use of them.
Private signals
You can observe private signals by drawing one marble from a covered
box. There are twenty white or red marbles in each box. White indicates
state "A" and red indicates state "B". The proportion of white and red varies
depending on the position, realized state, and treatment and it re‡ects the
preciseness of the signal for predicting the state. The preciseness of the
signal is printed below the number of position on the same card you will
draw. For example, suppose that under the state "A" you would have drawn
card printed "1" and ".55" in Treatment A. Then you draw one marble from
a box containing 11 white and 9 red marbles. Thus, the probability that you
draw a white marble from the box is 11/20=.55. Therefore the probability
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that your draw indicates the correct state is .55. In another example, suppose
that under the state "B" you would have drawn card printed "6" and ".8"
in treatment A. Then you draw one marble from a box containing 4 white
and 16 red marbles. In this case the probability that your draw indicates the
correct state is 16/20=.8.
2 treatments will be conducted in this experiment. In treatment A, you
will make predictions in ascending order of the signal preciseness. That is,
the subject who has the least precise signal (.55) makes the prediction in
position 1, the subject who has the second least precise signal (.6) makes
the prediction in position 2, and in this manner, the subject who has the
most precise signal (.8) makes the prediction in position 6 (last position). In
treatment S, you make predictions in descending order of the signal precise-
ness. That is, the subject who has the most precise signal (.8) makes the
prediction in position 1, the subjects who has the second most precise signal
(.75) makes the prediction in position 2, and in this manner, the subject
who has the least precise signal (.55) makes the prediction in position 6 (last
position). Which treatment is conducted is announced at the beginning of
each round.
The following tables summarize proportions of white and red marbles for
each position, realized state, and treatment. Note that your signals indicate
the correct state more accurately than random guessing in any case because
signal preciseness is always higher than .5.
Treatment A
Position (Signal preciseness)
State realized Marbles 1 (.55) 2 (.6) 3 (.65) 4 (.7) 5 (.75) 6 (.8)
A White 11 12 13 14 15 16
Red 9 8 7 6 5 4
B White 9 8 7 6 5 4
Red 11 12 13 14 15 16
Treatment S
Position (Signal preciseness)
State realized Marbles 1 (.8) 2 (.75) 3 (7) 4 (.65) 5 (.6) 6 (.55)
A White 16 15 14 13 12 11
Red 4 5 6 7 8 9
B White 4 5 6 7 8 9
Red 16 15 14 13 12 11
Predecessors’ predictions
In addition to private signals you will observe your predecessors’ predic-
tions. Once a subject submits a prediction, the experimenter will record it
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on the experimenter’s record sheet and show it to other subjects in later
positions. For example, the subject in position 2 can observe the prediction
made by the subject in position 1, the subject in position 3 can observe two
predictions made by the subjects in positions 1 and 2, the subject in posi-
tion 6 (last position) can observe …ve predictions made by the subjects in
positions from 1 to 5, and so on.
Thus, the subjects assigned to later than position 2 make predictions
by referring to both private signals and all of their predecessors’ predictions
whereas the subject in position 1 can observe only his or her private signal.
Procedure of the experiments
We call a sequence of making predictions by six subjects a round. In
today’s experiment you will make predictions for sixteen rounds. In each
round, experiment is conducted in the following procedure.
1. The experimenter announces which treatment to be conducted for that
round.
2. The experimenter draw a card which determines the state for that
round. After con…rming the letter the experimenter hide it from you.
3. You draw one card on which the position of making prediction and the
signal preciseness are written.
4. The experimenter approaches you one by one from position 1 to position
6 and present one box which contains the exact proportion of white and
red marbles for that position, realized state, and treatment.
5. You draw one marble from the box.
6. After con…rming the color of the marble, you replace it into the box
and write down the state indicated by the color of the marble in the
space printed "Your Signal" on the subject’s record sheet. At the same
time the experimenter also record it on the experimenter’s record sheet.
7. 3-6 is repeated until all of you observe the private signals.
8. You make your prediction when the experimenter approaches you and
tells you to do so. Before making a prediction, the experimenter shows a
sequence of your predecessors’ predictions to you. You write down them
in the space printed "Your Predecessors’ Predictions". A prediction is
made by writing down one of the two states you think which is more
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likely to be in the space printed "Your Prediction" on the subject’s
record sheet. Do not write your prediction until you are told to
do so.
9. Once a prediction is made, the experimenter checks it and write it down
on the experimenter’s record sheet. Then, the experimenter approaches
the subject in the next position and show the sequence of his or her
predecessors’ predictions.
10. 8-9 is repeated until all of you make predictions.
11. The card the experimenter have drawn is revealed. The experimenter
record the correct and incorrect predictions for each subject on the
experimenter’s record sheet.
Payment
Your payo¤ for participating this experiment depends on the number of
correct predictions. You will be paid 200 yen for a correct prediction and
0 yen for an incorrect prediction. Sum of the results for all 16 predictions
will be paid to you privately after the experiment. The theoretical possible
maximum payment is 3200 yen and the minimum is 0 yen.
Your information
Your private information concerning this experiment is not known to
anyone. Your name, address, student ID number, predictions, payo¤s are
con…dential.
Notice
This experiment is conducted based on scienti…c method. Please note
followings.
² Do not talk with others.
² Do not see others’ draw and record sheet.
² Do not write your signals and predictions until you are told to do so.
If you do not follow these instructions, you will be dismissed. In this case,
you cannot receive payo¤ you earned until then.
If you have any questions, raise your hand.
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C Bayesian posterior probability that state A
would have realized at each decision node19
C.1 Anti-seniority
Pr(Aj¾1A) .55 Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¼4A; ¾5A) .959732
Pr(Aj¾1B) .45 Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¼4A; ¾5B) .725888
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¾2A) .647059 Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¼4B; ¾5A) .814042
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¾2B) .44898 Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¼4B; ¾5B) .327231
Pr(Aj¼1B; ¾2A) .55102 Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¼4A; ¾5A) .873582
Pr(Aj¼1B; ¾2B) .352941 Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¼4A; ¾5B) .434327
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¾3A) .772973 Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¼4A; ¾5A) .913738
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¾3B) .496774 Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¼4A; ¾5B) .540643
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¾3A) .602105 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¼4A; ¾5A) .941019
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¾3B) .30496 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¼4A; ¾5B) .639344
Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¾3A) .69505 Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¼4B; ¾5A) .559322
Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¾3B) .397895 Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¼4B; ¾5B) .123596
Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¾3A) .503226 Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¼4A; ¾5A) .754374
Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¾3B) .227027 Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¼4A; ¾5B) .254425
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¾4A) .888199 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¼4A; ¾5A) .876404
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¾4B) .593361 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¼4A; ¾5B) .440678
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¾4A) .697283 Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¼4B; ¾5A) .660508
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¾4B) .297297 Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¼4B; ¾5B) .17775
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¾4A) .779292 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¼4A; ¾5A) .82225
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¾4B) .393398 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¼4A; ¾5B) .339492
Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¾4A) .841727 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¼4B; ¾5A) .745575
Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¾4B) .494134 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¼4B; ¾5B) .245626
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¾4A) .505866 Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¼4B; ¾5A) .360656
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¾4B) .158273 Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¼4B; ¾5B) .058981
Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¾4A) .702703 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¼4B; ¾5A) .459357
Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¾4B) .302717 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¼4B; ¾5B) .080262
Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¾4A) .606602 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¼4B; ¾5A) .565673
Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¾4B) .220708 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¼4B; ¾5B) .126418
Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¾4A) .406639 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¼4A; ¾5A) .672769
Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¾4B) .111801 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¼4A; ¾5B) .185958
19Bayesian posteriors are typed in italics if imbalance between Bayesian posterior and
private signal occurs.
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Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¼4B; ¾5A) .274112 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¼4B; ¼5A; ¾6A) .921394
Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¼4B; ¾5B) .040268 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¼4B; ¼5A; ¾6B) .422835
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¼4A; ¼5A; ¾6A) .989619 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¼4A; ¼5A; ¾6A) .948727
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¼4A; ¼5A; ¾6B) .856287 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¼4A; ¼5A; ¾6B) .536279
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¼4A; ¼5B; ¾6A) .913738 Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¼4B; ¼5B; ¾6A) .360656
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¼4A; ¼5B; ¾6B) .398329 Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¼4B; ¼5B; ¾6B) .034056
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¼4B; ¼5A; ¾6A) .945976 Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¼4B; ¼5B; ¾6A) .463721
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¼4B; ¼5A; ¾6B) .522533 Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¼4B; ¼5B; ¾6B) .051273
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¼4A; ¼5A; ¾6A) .965085 Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¼4A; ¼5B; ¾6A) .577165
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¼4A; ¼5A; ¾6B) .633373 Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¼4A; ¼5B; ¾6B) .078606
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¼4A; ¼5A; ¾6A) .976943 Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¼4B; ¼5A; ¾6A) .692913
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¼4A; ¼5A; ¾6B) .725888 Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¼4B; ¼5A; ¾6B) .123596
Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¼4A; ¼5A; ¾6A) .984572 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¼4B; ¼5B; ¾6A) .565673
Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¼4A; ¼5A; ¾6B) .799544 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¼4B; ¼5B; ¾6B) .075273
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¼4B; ¼5B; ¾6A) .660508 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¼4A; ¼5B; ¾6A) .672769
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¼4B; ¼5B; ¾6B) .108415 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¼4A; ¼5B; ¾6B) .113865
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¼4B; ¼5A; ¾6A) .835443 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¼4B; ¼5A; ¾6A) .772655
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¼4B; ¼5A; ¾6B) .240876 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¼4B; ¼5A; ¾6B) .175198
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¼4A; ¼5A; ¾6A) .924727 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¼4A; ¼5B; ¾6A) .759124
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¼4A; ¼5A; ¾6B) .434327 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¼4A; ¼5B; ¾6B) .164557
Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¼4A; ¼5A; ¾6A) .965944 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¼4B; ¼5A; ¾6A) .83896
Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¼4A; ¼5A; ¾6B) .639344 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¼4B; ¼5A; ¾6B) .245626
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¼4A; ¼5B; ¾6A) .754374 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¼4A; ¼5A; ¾6A) .891585
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¼4A; ¼5B; ¾6B) .16104 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¼4A; ¼5A; ¾6B) .339492
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¼4B; ¼5A; ¾6A) .886135 Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¼4B; ¼5B; ¾6A) .200456
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¼4B; ¼5A; ¾6B) .327231 Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¼4B; ¼5B; ¾6B) .015428
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¼4A; ¼5B; ¾6A) .824802 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¼4B; ¼5B; ¾6A) .274112
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¼4A; ¼5B; ¾6B) .227345 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¼4B; ¼5B; ¾6B) .023057
Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¼4A; ¼5B; ¾6A) .876404 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¼4B; ¼5B; ¾6A) .366627
Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¼4A; ¼5B; ¾6B) .307087 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¼4B; ¼5B; ¾6B) .034915
Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¼4A; ¼5B; ¾6A) .477467
Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¼4A; ¼5B; ¾6B) .054024
Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¼4B; ¼5A; ¾6A) .601671
Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¼4B; ¼5A; ¾6B) .086262
Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¼4B; ¼5B; ¾6A) .143713
Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¼4B; ¼5B; ¾6B) .010381
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C.2 Seniority
Pr(Aj¾1A) .8 Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¼4A; ¾5A) .987342
Pr(Aj¾1B) .2 Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¼4A; ¾5B) .971963
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¾2A) .923077 Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¼4B; ¾5A) .957655
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¾2B) .571729 Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¼4B; ¾5B) .909513
Pr(Aj¼1B; ¾2A) .428571 Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¼4A; ¾5A) .934754
Pr(Aj¼1B; ¾2B) .076923 Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¼4A; ¾5B) .864266
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¾3A) .965517 Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¼4A; ¾5A) .896552
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¾3B) .837209 Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¼4A; ¾5B) .793893
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¾3A) .756757 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¼4A; ¾5A) .829787
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¾3B) .363636 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¼4A; ¾5B) .684211
Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¾3A) .636364 Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¼4B; ¾5A) .80597
Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¾3B) .243243 Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¼4B; ¾5B) .648649
Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¾3A) .162791 Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¼4A; ¾5A) .614173
Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¾3B) .034483 Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¼4A; ¾5B) .414343
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¾4A) .981132 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¼4A; ¾5A) .351351
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¾4B) .937799 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¼4A; ¾5B) .19403
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¾4A) .905222 Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¼4B; ¾5A) .715328
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¾4B) .734694 Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¼4B; ¾5B) .527591
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¾4A) .852459 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¼4A; ¾5A) .472409
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¾4B) .626198 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¼4A; ¾5B) .284672
Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¾4A) .764706 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¼4B; ¾5A) .585657
Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¾4B) .485149 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¼4B; ¾5B) .385827
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¾4A) .514851 Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¼4B; ¾5A) .315789
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¾4B) .235294 Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¼4B; ¾5B) .170213
Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¾4A) .265306 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¼4B; ¾5A) .206107
Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¾4B) .094778 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¼4B; ¾5B) .103448
Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¾4A) .373802 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¼4B; ¾5A) .135734
Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¾4B) .147541 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¼4B; ¾5B) .065246
Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¾4A) .062201 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¼4A; ¾5A) .090487
Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¾4B) .018868 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¼4A; ¾5B) .042345
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Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¼4B; ¾5A) .028037 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¼4B; ¼5A; ¾6A) .633373
Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¼4B; ¾5B) .012658 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¼4B; ¼5A; ¾6B) .536279
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¼4A; ¼5A; ¾6A) .989619 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¼4A; ¼5A; ¾6A) .522533
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¼4A; ¼5A; ¾6B) .984572 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¼4A; ¼5A; ¾6B) .422835
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¼4A; ¼5B; ¾6A) .976943 Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¼4B; ¼5B; ¾6A) .692913
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¼4A; ¼5B; ¾6B) .965944 Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¼4B; ¼5B; ¾6B) .601671
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¼4B; ¼5A; ¾6A) .965085 Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¼4B; ¼5B; ¾6A) .577165
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¼4B; ¼5A; ¾6B) .948727 Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¼4B; ¼5B; ¾6B) .477467
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¼4A; ¼5A; ¾6A) .945976 Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¼4A; ¼5B; ¾6A) .463721
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¼4A; ¼5A; ¾6B) .921394 Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¼4A; ¼5B; ¾6B) .366627
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¼4A; ¼5A; ¾6A) .913738 Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¼4B; ¼5A; ¾6A) .360656
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¼4A; ¼5A; ¾6B) .876404 Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¼4B; ¼5A; ¾6B) .274112
Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¼4A; ¼5A; ¾6A) .856287 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¼4B; ¼5B; ¾6A) .434327
Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¼4A; ¼5A; ¾6B) .799544 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¼4B; ¼5B; ¾6B) .339492
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¼4B; ¼5B; ¾6A) .924727 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¼4A; ¼5B; ¾6A) .327231
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¼4B; ¼5B; ¾6B) .891585 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¼4A; ¼5B; ¾6B) .245626
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¼4B; ¼5A; ¾6A) .835443 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¼4B; ¼5A; ¾6A) .240876
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¼4B; ¼5A; ¾6B) .772655 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¼4B; ¼5A; ¾6B) .175198
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¼4A; ¼5A; ¾6A) .660508 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¼4A; ¼5B; ¾6A) .227345
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¼4A; ¼5A; ¾6B) .565673 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¼4A; ¼5B; ¾6B) .164557
Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¼4A; ¼5A; ¾6A) .398329 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¼4B; ¼5A; ¾6A) .16104
Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¼4A; ¼5A; ¾6B) .307087 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¼4B; ¼5A; ¾6B) .113865
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¼4A; ¼5B; ¾6A) .886135 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¼4A; ¼5A; ¾6A) .108415
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¼4A; ¼5B; ¾6B) .83896 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¼4A; ¼5A; ¾6B) .075273
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¼4B; ¼5A; ¾6A) .754374 Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¼4B; ¼5B; ¾6A) .200456
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¼4B; ¼5A; ¾6B) .672769 Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¼4B; ¼5B; ¾6B) .143713
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¼4A; ¼5B; ¾6A) .824802 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¼4B; ¼5B; ¾6A) .123596
Pr(Aj¼1A; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¼4A; ¼5B; ¾6B) .759124 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3B; ¼4B; ¼5B; ¾6B) .086262
Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¼4A; ¼5B; ¾6A) .725888 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¼4B; ¼5B; ¾6A) .078606
Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2A; ¼3A; ¼4A; ¼5B; ¾6B) .639344 Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3A; ¼4B; ¼5B; ¾6B) .054024
Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¼4A; ¼5B; ¾6A) .051273
Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¼4A; ¼5B; ¾6B) .034915
Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¼4B; ¼5A; ¾6A) .034056
Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¼4B; ¼5A; ¾6B) .023057
Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¼4B; ¼5B; ¾6A) .015428
Pr(Aj¼1B; ¼2B; ¼3B; ¼4B; ¼5B; ¾6B) .010381
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